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6.1  Introduction 
The choice of  a living arrangement-as  an independent household, with 
adult children or other related or unrelated persons, or in an institution-has 
many implications for the well-being of an elderly person. Changes in living 
arrangements are likely to be associated with changes in the level of care and 
assistance received by  the elderly. Living with other family members eases 
situations of  illness; living alone makes coping with illnesses harder. Thus, 
the choice of living arrangements has many external effects. Moreover, living 
arrangements  commonly affect the elderly’s eligibility for certain types of gov- 
ernment assistance, such as food stamps and supplemental  Social Security, and 
induces demand for social support services such as district nursing, meals-on- 
wheels, and so forth. Finally, the change of  living arrangements frequently 
involves the sale of  the home by  the elderly and may therefore dramatically 
change the liquid wealth of the elderly. On the other hand, if the elderly tend to 
live longer independently, the balance of the housing market changes because 
housing becomes relatively more scarce due to the increased length of stay in 
the family home by the older generation. In short, it is important to understand 
the determinants of  the living arrangement choice. 
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There is a long line of literature investigating the determinants of living ar- 
rangements of  the aged. Schwartz, Danziger, and Smolensky (1984) employ 
the Retirement History Survey (RHS) to estimate a binary choice model be- 
tween living independently  and  dependently. Their empirical results  were 
mixed, and neither health nor income effects are very strong. Borsch-Supan 
(1  989) estimates a multinomial logit model of living arrangements using data 
from the Annual Housing Survey (AHS). As in the paper by  Schwartz, Dan- 
ziger, and Smolensky, the data preclude an analysis of institutionalization. In 
contrast, Garber (1990) and Greene, Lovely, and Ondrich (1993) concentrate 
on the determinants of institutionalization and its duration, using the channel- 
ing  demonstration, while  Kotlikoff  and Moms  (1987,  1990) and  Borsch- 
Supan, Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Morris (1992) analyze the importance of fam- 
ily links in forming multigenerational households. 
Papers by  Ellwood and Kane (1990), Borsch-Supan (1990), and Borsch- 
Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff, and Moms (1  992) represent more comprehen- 
sive analyses of  living arrangements that include both institutionalized and 
noninstitutionalized elderly. All three papers find an increasing proportion of 
elderly living alone and  attribute this  to  the positive income  elasticity of 
privacy. 
These studies leave several questions unanswered. First, most studies of liv- 
ing arrangements suffer from a less than satisfactory description of health. This 
is partly due to lack of data, but the problem is deeper: even when health is 
measured by  indicators such as activities of daily living (ADLs) and instru- 
mental activities of daily living (IADLs), or by the presence of conditions such 
as cancer or Alzheimer’s disease, or by simply asking the elderly how they feel, 
we do not really measure health but a concoction of subjective feelings and 
objective states that are correlated with health. In the language of economet- 
rics, health is a latent, unmeasurable variable, for which we only observe a set 
of indicators. One goal of this paper is to develop an econometric framework 
in order to model this errors-in-variables problem in the discrete decision of 
living arrangements. We relate latent health to ADLs and IADLs by a nonlinear 
version of a multiple-indicator, multiple-cause (MIMIC) model, which explic- 
itly considers the categorical measurement of the health indicators. We  esti- 
mate this model using data from the Longitudinal Study on Aging (LSOA). 
Another important question that has not been answered is the role of wealth. 
Does housing wealth tie the elderly to their homes? This question extends the 
lock-in discussion (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Venti and Wise 1990) to 
household formation. What is the role of  financial wealth in the demand for 
old-age institutions? Wealth data are rarely available in elderly surveys, and if 
so, their value may be questionable. We  will explore in this respect the Na- 
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Economics Supplement of the 
LSOA, which contains information on income and assets of the LSOA sample 
persons in 1990. 
The paper is set up as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the data sources and 195  Living Arrangements: Health and Wealth Effects 
presents descriptive statistics of  our working sample. Estimates based on  a 
standard discrete choice model are briefly described in section 6.3. In section 
6.4 we discuss the econometric model and address the issues of identification 
and estimation, while section 6.5 presents the results and section 6.6 con- 
cludes. 
6.2  The Longitudinal Study on Aging and the NBER Economic 
Supplement 
The LSOA is a panel survey based on the 1984 Supplement  on Aging (SOA) 
to the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). The NHISs are continuing 
surveys comprising each year about 100,000 noninstitutionalized persons of 
all ages in about 40,000 households (see Kovar and Poe 1985). Interviews are 
held every week throughout the year. The SOA was added to the NHIS during 
the 1984 interviews. The SOA included questions on 
family structure, 
community and social support, 
9  occupation and retirement, 
conditions and impairment, ADLs and IADLs, 
structural characteristics of housing, 
regular medical care and nursing home stay, and 
health opinions and behavior 
to all NHIS sample persons aged 65 years and over.' The questions were simi- 
lar to those in the 1984 National Nursing Home Survey (NNHS), so that when 
the two data sets are combined, estimates for the total elderly population are 
possible. 
The SOA was explicitly designed to be the first wave of the LSOA. In 1986, 
1988, and 1990, all persons aged 70 and above in the 1984 SOA were rein- 
terviewed by  computer-assisted telephone interviews with mail follow-ups 
(National Center for Health Statistics 1991). 
Records for participants who gave permission were also matched with the 
National Death Index maintained by the National Center for Health Statistics 
and the Medicare files maintained by the Health Care Financing Administra- 
tion. While the first wave does not include the institutionalized  elderly, sample 
persons were interviewed in the later waves even when they entered a nursing 
home or another institution. 
In  1990 the NBER added an Economics Supplement to the LSOA. This 
supplement included a detailed account of personal income sources for each 
sample person, an inventory of assets including financial and real wealth, and 
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questions about structural housing characteristics. Response rates to these 
questions were smaller than to the standard LSOA questions, and particularly 
small to the wealth questions.2 
As a working sample, we  selected only single elderly because almost all 
married elderly are living independently. In the 1990 cross-section this work- 
ing sample consists of 2,193 elderly between age 76 and 102. The average age 
in 1990 was almost 83 years. 
Table  6.1 presents descriptive statistics of  the most  important variables. 
Even in this sample of the very old and nonmarried, 63% live by themselves; 
28.7% live with their children, other relatives, or nonrelatives, and 8.2% live 
in institutions. Women make up 81.4% of the sample.  The nonwhite population 
is underrepresented with only 9.2%. On average, the sample persons have two 
children still living. 
The economic variables comprise income and wealth. Income is very low: 
the median is below $2,400, and 27.6% report no income at all. On the other 
hand, 63.4% have their own home, and except for less than 15% of  the home- 
owners, this home is free and clear of  mortgages. The median value of  the 
home is $31,000, and the average value is about $50,000. The discrepancy 
between mean and median is much larger for financial assets. The median fi- 
nancial assets sum up to only $3,500, while the mean is ten times as large. 
These numbers are approximately in line with results from the Survey of In- 
come and Program Participation (SIPP) and other surveys (Venti and Wise 
1991). 
Table 6.1 also reports on a set of health indicators. We restrict our attention 
to functional health measures such as the ADLs and the IADLs, which are 
measured in four categories (no, some, severe problems in doing xyz, and can- 
not do xyz at all). The variables are coded such that higher values for ADLs 
and IADLs indicate less capability. Functional health indicators have  been 
found most appropriate  in describing living arrangements, and superior to sub- 
jective health ratings or indicators for the presence and severity of diagnosed 
conditions (Borsch-Supan,  Kotlikoff, and Morris 1991).  Table 6.1 lists the per- 
centages of sample persons who have no problems in performing a set of ten 
activities. IADLs were asked only for the noninstitutionalized,  ADLs for all 
sample persons. The pattern is familiar: most problems occur with walking, 
and the fewest with eating. 
6.3  The Standard Approach: Multinomial Logit Analysis 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present results of a simple multinomial logit model, relat- 
ing the choice of  living arrangements to demographic, economic, and-in 
2. The response rate to financial assets was 63.5%. Missing values were assigned by  Edward 
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Table 6.1  Description of Variables: Longitudinal Study on Aging 1990 
Dependent variable (living arrangements) (%) 
Living with others 
Living in an institution 
LNARG  Living independently 
Demographic exogenous variables 
AGE90  Age in 1990 (years) 
EDUC  Highest grade completed (years) 
RACE 
GENDER  Female = 1 (%) 
DAUGHTERS  Number of living daughters 
SONS  Number of living sons 
OWN  Homeownership = 1 (%) 
MORTG  Home free and clear = 1 
Black and Hispanic = 1 (%) 
Economic exogenous variables 
FIN  Financial assets ($) 
Stocks, bonds, mutual funds 
Savings, other bank accounts 
INCPERS  Annual personal income ($) 
HOME  House value, all ($) 
House value, owners ($) 
Health indicators (96) 
Activities of daily living: sample person without difficulties 
BATH  Bathing 
DRESS  Dressing 
EAT  Eating 
GETUP  Getting up from bedchair 
WALK  Walking 
OUTSD  Getting outside 












Mean  Median 
36,012  3,500 
16,517 
19,495 
7,748  2,394 
38,113  20,000 







86.4  - 
Instrumental activities of daily living: sample person without difficultiesb 
HOUSEW  Doing light housework  77.9 
SHOP  Shopping  68.9 
MEALS  Preparing meals  75.0 
Source: Longitudinal Study on Aging 1990. 
Note: Means and medians were computed on the working sample of 2,193 elderly. 
'Percentage of owners. 
bAsked only for elderly persons in households. 
table 6.3-health  indicators. Both versions of the discrete choice model show 
that educated persons are less likely to live with others or in nursing homes, 
and that the probability of  living with others (mainly children) increases with 
the number of daughters but not significantly with the number of sons. Higher 
wealth increases the likelihood of living with children, while there is no sig- 
nificant wealth effect in institutionalization, except that ownership of a house 
reduces the probability of entering a nursing home. 
The contribution of  the health indicators in table 6.3 is highly significant- 198  Axel Borsch-Supan, Daniel L. McFadden, and Reinhold Schnabel 
Table 6.2  Multinomial Logit Model: Estimation Results 
Probability to . .  .  Rather Than to Live Independently 
Live with Children 
or Others  Live in an Institution 





































-  11.35623 
0.13259 
-0.08393 
-  1.09008 
-0.09591 
0.06029 


















Source: Longitudinal Study on Aging 1990. 
Notes: Sample size = 2,193 elderly. Log likelihood = -1,657.1 
the log likelihood increases considerably, and the likelihood ratio test statistic 
is 718.2. However, the inclusion of so many indicators results in multicollin- 
earity and low t-statistics among the individual ADLs. This is one reason to 
contemplate using factor analysis in describing the effect of the health indica- 
tors. Exploratory factor analysis, taking the health indicators as if  they were 
continuous indicators, shows that more than three-quarters of the variance can 
be explained by only two factors. 
The inclusion of the health indicators does not change the other parameters 
by  a lot. The main exception is age, which becomes insignificant once the 
functional health measures are taken into account. In turn, personal income, 
which was insignificant when the health indicators were left out, increases in 
statistical importance, with a negative effect on institutionalization and living 
with others. 
These results essentially reproduce the estimates of  Borsch-Supan, Kotli- 
koff, and Morris (1991). This is helpful to know because the latter estimates 
were obtained from a geographically very restricted sample of Massachusetts 
elderly, the  Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for  the Aged  (HRCA) sample. 
Knowing that the HRCA sample is representative at least in the respect of 
choosing living arrangements gives confidence in the other analyses that have 
been performed on the basis of this rich data 
3. Kotlikoff and Morris (1987, 1990); Borsch-Supan, Kotlikoff, and Moms (1991); Borsch- 
Supan, Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Moms (1992);  Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff, and Mor- 
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Table 6.3  Multinomial Logit: Estimation Results with Activities of Daily Living 
and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
Probability to . . . Rather Than to Live Independently 
Live with Children 
or Others  Live in an Institution 





























-  0.90636 
0.00150 
0.00155 





































































Source: Longitudinal Study on Aging 1990. 
Nores: Sample size = 2,193 elderly. Log likelihood = -  1,298.0. 
6.4  An Econometric Model of the Influence of Latent Health 
6.4.1  Model Specification 
Obviously, the contribution of  the health indicators in table 6.3 is highly 
significant. However, one might doubt that these indicators directly affect the 
choice of living arrangements. Rather, one might argue that it is the underlying 
but unobservable health status that affects both, the choice of living arrange- 
ments and the set of  indicators. The problem boils down to the question of 
causal links among four groups of variables: 
the choice among No living arrangements, denoted by  u, 
the latent health status, denoted by h*, N,-dimensional, 
the health indicators (ADLs and IADLs), denoted by yk, 
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the demographic and economic exogenous variables, denoted by zj, 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 visualize the two approaches, using the above notation 
for the four variable groups, and distinguishing latent from observable vari- 
ables by an asterisk. In addition to latent health, we have two more latent vari- 
ables. First, the choice between the discrete alternatives u depends on the unob- 
served utility levels u?, i  = 1,  . . . ,  No.  In our case N, equals three (living 
independently, with others, or in an institution). A person chooses the living 
arrangement that yields the highest utility level u?; 
j=  1,  ...,  Nz. 
Iu1  Choice 
t 
Fig. 6.1 
Health Indicators  Ex0g.Vat-s 
Multinomial logit model 
Choice 




Health  IADLs 
a-m 
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(1)  u = i  e  u,* = max(u,?,  j = 1,.  . . ,  N,). 
This is the conventional random utility-maximization hypothesis underlying 
discrete choice. Second, we also do not precisely observe the health indicators 
because the sample persons are asked to report their performance in each activ- 
ity using S, ordinal categories (e.g., no, some, severe problems in walking, and 
cannot walk at all) rather than a continuous scale. The relation between the kth 
observed health indicator ya  and the underlying continuous y:  is described by 
thresholds paj,  which will be estimated: 
(2) Yk =j  Fk,j-l  <  Y:  < pk,j?  k=  1  ,...,  N,,j=  1  ,...,  S,. 
In the discrete choice model of the preceding section, the choice of  living 
arrangements is directly linked to the ordinal health indicators and to the exog- 
enous variables (fig. 6.1). Moreover, the transmission between ordinal mea- 
surement and continuous indicators (equation 2) is ignored. The unobserved 
utility levels u? are therefore given by 
(34 
where 2,  denotes an additive error term in the utility of alternative i. Alternative 
1 (living independently) is taken as the reference alternative. 
The MIMIC model endogenizes the indicators ye Latent health determines 
both indicators and living arrangement choice. The model also takes the cate- 
gorical measurement of the health indicators and the choice decision into ac- 
count. Moreover, our MIMIC model distinguishes  between the direct influence 
of  the exogenous variables on the living arrangement choice, and the indirect 
influence via the latent health status. 
u$ = 8,'~  + yly + q,  i = 2, . . . ,  N~, 
The unobserved utility levels u:  are now determined by 
(3b)  u,*  = p,'z + yz'h* + E,,  i = 2, . . . ,  Nu. 
Rather than taking the health indicators as given, we determine them now 
by the health status in a factor-analytic model: 
(4)  y:  = h;h* + q,,  k = I, . . . ,  Ny. 
Finally, a set of equations expresses the influence of the exogenous variables 
on the latent health status: 
(5)  h,* = 6;z  + em,  m = 1,. . . ,  N,,, 
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One may interpret relation 5 as a production function of health. Due to prog- 
ress in medical science, this function may change over time. 
The three sets of equations 3b, 4, and 5 form a nonlinear version of a LIS- 
REL model." It is nonlinear in two respects. First, the main dependent variable, 
the choice of living arrangements, is described by a nonlinear discrete choice 
model that links the observed choices u to the latent utilities u*  (equation 1). 
McFadden (1988) introduced this case of factor analysis in the presence of a 
discrete choice equation, and Morikawa, Ben-Akiva, and McFadden (1990) 
present an application to travel demand. 
Our model introduces a second nonlinearity with the additional complica- 
tion of  categorical indicators. The measurement equations 4, which link the 
indicators  y*  with the health status h*  via the factor loadings A,,  are described 
by ordered probit models if we assume the qr  to be normally distributed. 
By inserting equation 5 into 3b and 4, we eliminate the health production 
equation and obtain two sets of reduced-form equations on which our estima- 
tion will be based: 
(6)  UT = p,!~  + $(A'z  + 5) + E,,  i = 2, .  . . ,  N, 
= TZ!Z + y*!t + E,, 
and similarly for the factor-analysis equations that determine the health indi- 
cators: 
where the reduced-form parameters IT, and JI, are 
(8) 
and 
T,!  = pr' + -y,!A'  for i = 2, 3 
I):  = A:  A'  fork = 1, . . . ,  N,. 
6.4.2  The Likelihood Function 
We  assume that the three groups of  error terms 6,  E, and q are mutually 
independent. Moreover, we assume that the E  are extreme-value distributed, 
resulting in a logit model for the choice equation 6. The q are assumed to be 
normal, resulting in N, ordered probit models for the health indicators. The 
likelihood of  an individual who has chosen alternative i and is characterized 
by the values of the health indicators  jk,  k = 1, . . . ,  Ny,  conditional on t,  the 
4.  See Joreskog and Sorbom (1988) for a description of  LISREL (analysis of linear structural 
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errors of  the health equation, is therefore a product of  the probabilities of  a 
logit model and N,  ordered probit modeW 
(9) 
Nv 
= LOGIT( i, 2,  5) n ORDPROBIT(  j,, z, 5). 
k= I 
We  now have to eliminate the error terms 5  in equation 9, which represent 
the latent components of the health status. We accomplish this by integrating 
over the N,-dimensional error term, assuming that the 5  are jointly standard 
normally distributed, possibly with correlations p(C,,  5,’).  The unconditional 
likelihood function is therefore 
(10)  UP,  7, A, A,  P,  P)  =  -  NV 
LOGIT(i, z, 5) n  ORDPROBIT(jk,  z, 6)  ($45,  P)  d5. 
We  estimate the nonlinear MIMIC model by  maximizing the sum of  the 
individual log-likelihood contributions over the coefficients P, y,  A, and A, 
over the thresholds pk,j,  and over the correlations p among the latent health 
components. 
6.4.3  Identification and Estimation 
In order to check the identification of the system, we start by inspecting the 
set of  equations 7, which make up the ordered probit part of  the likelihood 
function.6  Maximizing equation 10 directly identifies the absolute value of the 
factor loadings A,  attached to 5  through the term Ah(  in the case of orthogonal 
6. The signs are not identified because the thresholds pj,, of the ordered probit 
can be ordered either way. By counting the elements of Sm, the coefficients of 
the exogenous variables in the health equations, and the elements of  the re- 
duced form parameters  +k  in the ordered probit part 
I-_  k= I 
5. For notational convenience the index for individual observations is left out. 
6. In  the sequel we consider uncorrelated  5. If the 6 are correlated, the p have to be estimated 
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it becomes clear that the structural coefficients 6, are identified only if N, 2 
Nh.  Hence, the number of indicators  yk  has to be at least as large as the number 
of  latent health dimensions h*. Since in typical applications the number of 
indicators tends to be large compared to the number of  underlying factors, 
identification of X and 6 is easily achieved. 
In contrast to the factor loadings X,  in equations 7, the coefficients of health 
in the choice of living arrangements, yi,  are not identifiable through the term 
yt! 6 because the scale in the discrete choice model is undetermined. Moreover, 
the coefficients of  the exogenous variables in the choice of  living arrange- 
ments, pi,  are also not directly identifiable even though 6, is given: 
The number of elements in pi equals the number of reduced-form parameters 
in mi. Since yi  is not identifiable,  there is an excess number of structural param- 
eters equal to the number of elements in yi, the number of health dimensions. 
Hence, pi and yi can be identified only by imposing further restrictions. 
We  explore two possibilities of  identifying pi and  yi:’ identification in a 
cross-section with Nh parameter restrictions on each pi, and identification in 
repeated cross-sections exploiting parameter differences in A over time. 
In the first case we impose the assumption that at least Nh exogenous vari- 
ables influence the choice of living arrangements only indirectly via their in- 
fluence on health, but not directly. This pins down the parameters yi,  the impact 
of health on choice. With yi  given, the remaining pi  are just identified.* 
In the second approach we impose the assumption that the coefficients of the 
main choice equation 3b do not change over time but that technical progress in 
medical science changes the health production function (equations 5). With 
two cross-sections t,  and t2,  we first estimate the reduced form coefficients: 
7. Other identification approaches are possible with panel data. 
8. Identification of factor analytic models through linear parameter restrictions has been intro- 
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Then yi  can be estimated from 
provided that N, 2  Nh. 
In either approach to identification, we first estimate the reduced form pa- 
rameters by maximizing equation 10 using equations 8. In a second step we 
compute the structural parameters by  a minimum-distance method (nonlinear 
generalized least squares) applied to equations 8. 
Given the results from the exploratory factor analysis, we assume that two 
dimensions suffice to describe the latent health status. For simplicity we also 
impose p($,, 5,)  = 0, although other factor structures can be thought of. Even 
with p = 0, the integral in equation 10 does not factor easily due to the func- 
tional  form. In  order  to  evaluate the  integral we  therefore employ  two- 
dimensional Gauss-Hermite integration. 
6.5  Estimation Results 
Table  6.4  presents the reduced form estimates of  the nonlinear MIMIC 
model. The first panel refers to the discrete choice submodel (equations 6) with 
parameters  IT,  while the second panel represents estimates of the ordered probit 
submodel (equations 7) with parameters  ICIk,  X,,  and pk.  In addition to the factor 
loadings yk  for the two latent health status variables and the switch points p? 
some of the structural parameters P,  in the living arrangement choice (equa- 
tions 3b) can directly be identified because the corresponding  8,  (equations 5) 
are zero. These are the coefficients of those exogenous variables that appear in 
the upper but not in the lower panel. The corresponding rows of coefficients 
are marked by  P = IT. 
The results are encouraging. The large r-values of  IT  and  IJJ  show that the 
causal links in figure 6.2 are significant. The values of the “thresholds” p,*  and 
pf  and the corresponding t-statistics have to be interpreted with care: large 
negative values and  t-values indicate that the difference between adjacent 
thresholds is small, while t-values close to zero indicate that the null (i.e., 
exp(0) = 1) cannot be rejected. We proceed in estimating the structural coeffi- 
cients. We first pursue identification through parameter restrictions. 
9. The proper ordering of the thresholds has been enforced by the parameterization: pz  = p,  + 
exp(pT) and k,  = p2  + exp(p;).  This ensures pI  < pz  <  p,. In  the tables we display pl.  p:  and 
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Table 6.4  Multiple-Indicator,  Multiple-Cause Model: Reduced Form 1990 
Living Arrangement Choice (equations 6) 
Probability to . .  . Rather Than to Live Independently 
Live with Children 
or Others  Live in an Institution 


































-  12.87920 
0.1551  1 
-0.12186 














1.35  (P=T) 
-0.42 
-7.63 
-1.24  (P=P) 
1.11  (P=n) 
1.20  (P=?r) 









MU2  *b 
MU3*b 
0.114  13.00 
-0.034  -2.55 
0.968  5.49 
0.059  0.41 
-0.324  -3.02 
-1.084  -13.10 
-1.717  -18.30 
13.254  13.36 
-0.138  1.89 
-0.785  -6.63 
Going Outside 
0.129  11.26 
-0.040  -2.74 
1.193  6.21 
-0.208  -1.48 
-0.517  -4.55 
-1.210  -13.74 
-1.702  -18.45 
12.339  12.28 
-0.050  -0.63 
-0.478  -3.58 
Light Housework 
0.104  9.32 
-0.043  -2.92 
0.799  4.65 
0.189  1.35 
-0.479  -4.53 
-1.322  -13.67 
-  1.493  -  18.49 
9.870  9.91 
0.162  2.27 
-0.167  -1.43 
Preparing Meals 
0.103  11.73 
-0.050  -4.26 
0.652  4.90 
-0.007  -0.06 
-0.406  -4.79 
-1.123  -14.27 
-1.260  -20.63 
8.367  11.26 
0.231  4.62 












0.186  13.92 
-0.077  -4.89 
1.118  5.82 
0.163  1.04 
-0.574  -4.69 
-  1.376  -  13.33 
-2.035  -17.06 
16.645  14.16 
-0.272  -3.19 
-0.422  -3.94 
0.199  11.28 
-0.102  -5.43 
1.153  5.27 
-0.225  -1.39 
-0.852  -5.95 
-0.761  -8.31 
-2.621  -  14.88 
17.485  11.51 
-0.749  -6.30 
-1.078  -6.48 
0.208  12.40 
-0.135  -6.94 
1.264  6.01 
-0.029  -0.17 
-0.832  -5.84 
-0.625  -7.21 
-2.689  -  15.55 
17.852  12.44 
-0.496  -4.47 
-0.884  -5.99 
0.223  14.97 
-0.127  -7.50 
1.154  6.15 
0.420  2.51 
-0.726  -5.85 
-0.718  -9.62 
-2.308  -  16.68 
18.791  14.80 
-0.867  -7.97 
-1.098  -8.49 
~~ 
Source: Longitudinal Study on Aging 1990. 
Notes: Sample size = 2,193  elderly. Log likelihood = -8,122. 
"Left-hand columns are coefficients, right-hand are r-values. 
"rJ.:  and pT  are defined by  p2  = p.,  + exp (@) and ps  = p2  + exp (pT). 207  Living Arrangements: Health and Wealth Effects 
In selecting possible restrictions, the main question is which variables are 
most likely to influence the living arrangement decision only by their indirect 
impact on health without directly influencing the living arrangement choice. 
Of the variables included, age per se as well as education certainly does effect 
the health status but is less likely to directly affect living arrangement choices. 
This is also clear from the exploratory logit analysis, table 6.3, where age in 
both columns and education in the second column become insignificant after 
including the health indicators. The estimated coefficient of  education, al- 
though still significant in the first column, decreases in magnitude and its sig- 
nificance level. 
Table 6.5 presents the estimates. The upper panel displays the living arrange- 
ment choice equation. The demographic variables are weaker than  in  the 
multinomial logit estimation, table 6.3, except for the “daughters’ effect.” Liv- 
ing with children is strongly correlated with the number of daughters who can 
take care of the elderly. There is no corresponding “sons’ effect.” 
Higher financial and housing wealth significantly increases the likelihood to 
live with children, while the ownership of a house reduces the probability of 
entering a nursing home. The positive correlation  between wealth of the elderly 
and living together appears to be evidence in favor of the “bribery hypothesis” 
of Kotlikoff and Morris (1990)-wealthy  elderly who like to be taken care of 
by their children are able to bribe the children, who would rather live by them- 
selves, if  it weren’t for the shared wealth. Unfortunately, we do not know the 
wealth of the children to shed more light on this issue. Because the wealth of 
children is commonly highly correlated with the wealth of  the parents, the 
coefficients may also express a supply effect: only wealthy children can take 
their parents in. As a caveat, we note that reported wealth may reflect house- 
hold wealth including the younger generation’s wealth, although the question 
in  the survey instrument was intended to record the personal wealth of  the 
elderly sample person. 
The strong negative and significant coefficient on the MORTG variable tells 
us that the few elderly who still have mortgages on their home are unlikely to 
move  to their children’s  home (or, though not  significantly, into a nursing 
home). This is easily explained by the fact that almost all elderly with a mort- 
gage are recent movers and unlikely to move again. 
The main point of the MIMIC model was capturing the influence of health. 
Both health variables significantly affect the choice to live with children. While 
the first factor affects only the probability of  living with children, a higher 
value of the second health factor, indicating a healthier elderly person, makes 
both dependent living arrangements less likely than living independently. 
What are the two health factors? If  we look at the next block of results- 
pertaining to the health measurement equations 4-we  see that the second 
factor is strongly associated with the IADLs, while the first factor is more 
related to the first four ADLs. Looking at the health production function- 
lower panel of table 6.5, compare equations 5-we  see that the second factor 208  Axel BSrsch-Supan, Daniel L. McFadden, and Reinhold Schnabel 
Table 6.5  Structural Parameters of the Multiple-Indicator,  Multiple-Cause 
Model 
Living Arrangement Choice (equations 3b) 
Probability to . . .  Rather Than  to Live Independently 
Live with Children 
or Others  Live in an Institution 


































-  12.49175 

































Bathing  Dressing  Getting Up 
-1.057  -13.15  -1.179  -13.78  -1.333  -14.18 
-1.635  -19.07  -1.616  -19.30  -1.440  -18.52 
12.390  16.28  13.005  16.85  11.284  14.75 
-0.164  -2.28  -0.048  -0.63  0.169  2.41 
-0.805  -6.94  -0.506  -3.87  -0.146  -1.27 
Going Outside  Light Housework  Preparing Meals 
-1.370  -13.66  -0.772  -8.55  -0.638  -7.54 
-2.039  -  17.53  -2.490  -  14.97  -2.654  -16.01 
15.540  15.32  18.795  14.14  19.631  14.84 
-0.242  -2.89  -0.763  -6.35  -0.479  -4.41 
-0.461  -4.39  -1.118  -6.84  -0.899  -6.21 
Health Production (equations 5) 
Walking 
-1.154  -15.17 
-1.273  -21.38 
8.976  14.86 
0.270  5.54 
-0.091  -1.31 
Shopping 
-0.711  -9.66 
-2.369  -17.46 
16.976  14.99 
-0.895  -8.39 
-1.160  -9.16 
~~~  ~~  ~~ 
HEALTH1  HEALTH2 
AGE 90  -0.002 16  -0.31  -0.08708  -20.15 
EDUC  0.02881  2.97  0.05623  9.56 
GENDER  0.04999  0.55  0.01938  0.34 
0  WN  0.02259  0.31  0.32748  7.24 
RACE  0.20709  1.85  -0.427  10  -6.83 
Source: Longitudinal Study on Aging 1990. 
Nores: Sample size = 2,193  elderly. Identification is by parameter restrictions. 
aLeft-hand columns are coefficients, right-hand are r-values. 
bp;  and p? are defined by p2  = p,  + exp (p;)  and p3 = p2  + exp (fit). 209  Living Arrangements: Health and Wealth Effects 
is mainly determined by age, while the most important determinant  for the first 
factor is education. The first health factor works more like a random effect, 
while the second factor carries the deterministic component associated with 
the exogenous variables. 
The coefficients of the sociodemographic variables in table 6.5 have a pat- 
tern similar to the coefficients in table 6.3. However, some of the magnitudes 
change considerably. For example, the coefficients of the RACE and the OWN 
variables in the first column almost double in magnitude compared to table 
6.3. In general, the changes are largest for those variables that appear in several 
equations of the system and not only in the choice equation. If we believe in 
the a priori assumptions underlying the MIMIC model, we must conclude that 
the multinomial logit model yields biased parameter results. 
One may also be interested in seeing whether the nonlinear MIMIC model 
predicts better than the simple multinomial logit model. This is a weak test of 
the a priori assumptions underlying the MIMIC model. It is weak because the 
real strength of the structural model is the prediction of the effect of structural 
changes. However, the data do not provide such an experiment. 
In order to test the out-of-sample performance, we used the 1986 and 1988 
waves of  the LSOA. We restricted attention to the unmarried elderly, so the 
1986 and 1988 samples are smaller than the 1990 sample due to those elderly 
who were still married in 1986 or 1988. Table 6.6 shows the results. 
In the in-sample prediction, the multinomial logit model fits the sample bet- 
ter than the nonlinear MIMIC model. It produces better estimates of the institu- 
tionalization probability, and it has an  overall higher success rate. This might 
be expected from an atheoretical model designed to describe the data. The 
balance changes in the out-of-sample prediction. Now the nonlinear model has 
a better overall performance, and it is closer in predicting living with others. 
Again, this reversal is exactly what an econometrician  wishes for a model that 
may mine the sample worse but capture the true structure better. The improve- 
ment, however, is rather modest. It would be helpful to have a holdout sample 
that consists of different elderly persons rather than of the same persons two 
years prior to the estimation period. 
We  also pursued the second method to identify the structural parameters in 
exploiting the variation in the health production function over time; see equa- 
tion 14. We use the difference between the matrices A,,,  and AIM, estimated 
for the 1988 and 1990 waves, maintaining that the structural coefficients of the 
choice equation (p, y)  remain constant. It would be preferable to estimate the 
second set of coefficients from a cross-section as far away from 1990 as pos- 
sible in order to capture a sufficient change in health technology, rather than 
using 1988. However, the 1986 wave has very few institutionalized persons, 
and the 1984 wave has none. The results are disappointing  because the differ- 
ence between A,,,,  and ALM  turns out to be virtually random: two years are 
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Table 6.6  Prediction Performance of the 'ho  Alternative Models (%) 
Nonlinear  Nonlinear 
Multinomial  MIMIC  MIMIC 
Observed  Logit  Reduced Form  Structural Form 
In-sample 1990 
Alone  64.02  79.30  82.58  73.83 
With others  28.45  13.41  15.18  23.16 
Institution  7.52  7.30  2.33  3.01 
% correct  74.15  69.08  63.61 
Alone  67.50  87.32  86.70  76.97 
With others  28.63  9.44  12.07  21.65 
Institution  3.87  3.24  1.22  1.38 
% correct  68.19  70.96  64.85 
Alone  70.96  90.30  89.66  78.40 
With others  27.62  8.50  10.12  21.18 
Institution  1.42  1.20  0.2  0.42 
% correct  74.86  72.8  67.07 
Out-of-sample  1988 
Out-of-sample 1986 
Source: Longitudinal Study on  Aging  1986,  1988, and 1990. Sample size is  1,412,  1,963,  and 
2,193  elderly, respectively. 
6.6  Conclusions 
Like the entire paper, the conclusions address econometric methodology as 
well as economic substance. We start with econometrics. 
This paper is a classical exercise in what econometrics is supposed to do- 
and where the problems of  sophisticated econometrics are. It uses a priori 
knowledge drawn from economics (and from common sense) in order to struc- 
ture the inference we  draw from the data. The multinomial logit model is 
atheoretical in the sense that it makes no usage of the causal links depicted in 
figure 6.1. In turn,  the MIMIC model in figure 6.2 employs a rather involved 
superstructure to guide our inference. 
The main problem with this model is of course identification. After all, the 
MIMIC model uses the same information as the simple multinomial logit 
model, and only introduces a potentially large number of latent variable con- 
structs. In  addition to postulating causal links as in  figure 6.2,  additional 
parameter restrictions were required. In the first case identification via exclu- 
sion restrictions is pretty much in the spirit of conventional simultaneous  equa- 
tion models. In the second case we assumed that some parameters change over 
time while others stay constant. Both identifying assumptions can easily be 
criticized. If the identifying assumptions are false, our estimates are inconsis- 
tent. If they are true, we have gained efficiency and have learned more about 
those structural coefficients that we have estimated. 
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much better than the cross-section  models of section 6.5. The latent health 
variables have a function very similar to random effects. This is the reason they 
are so hard to identify in cross-sections. By exploiting the panel structure, we 
could identify, say, two latent health statuses in 1988 as well as in 1990, possi- 
bly correlated over time. The likelihood function would be similar to equation 
10 but would require higher dimensional integration. In further research we 
will estimate this model by employing simulation methods for the computation 
of these integrals, such as the smooth simulated maximum-likelihood approach 
of Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993). 
As for economic substance, the coefficients of our main interest were health 
and wealth. While wealth is an important economic variable in the choice of 
living arrangements, income has proven to be of little relevance once wealth is 
included. Health is one of the main predictors of living arrangement choices. 
This is to be expected. Health is well captured by two factors, one associated 
with independent activities and strongly related to age, while the other, more 
person-specific factor is associated with more basic capabilities. Living with 
others, mainly children, is positively affected by financial and housing wealth, 
while homeowners are less likely to become institutionalized. 
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Comment  Steven F.  Venti 
Axel Borsch-Supan, Daniel McFadden, and Reinhold Schnabel present and 
estimate a model of the effects of health and wealth on the living arrangements 
of the elderly. Most of my  discussion will deal with wealth effects on living 
Steven E Venti is professor of economics at Dartmouth College and  a research associate of  the 
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arrangements. This is a bit unfair, since the principal objective of the paper is 
to obtain better estimates of the effect of health on living arrangements. Let 
me say at the outset that this objective has been met. I thus have little to add, 
either critically or constructively,  to their comprehensive and thorough analysis 
of health effects. Instead I will focus on some other implications of their work 
I find interesting. 
For the benefit of those who have not followed this area of research closely, 
let me briefly review some of the dramatic changes in living arrangements  over 
the past two or three decades. If we concentrate attention on unmarried per- 
sons, age 75-79,  we find that the percentage living independently has approxi- 
mately doubled over the period 1960-90. Over the same period the percentage 
living with relatives has fallen by  half, and the percentage living in nursing 
homes, although still small (about 7%), has doubled. The last few decades have 
also witnessed substantial growth of the wealth of the elderly. The explosion 
in house prices in the 1970s and early 1980s, the run-up in the stock market, 
the favorable “deal” received by the current retirement generation on their So- 
cial Security investment, and the increasing pension coverage of recent retire- 
ment cohorts have all contributed to this trend. 
It seems natural to consider whether these two trends-rising  wealth and an 
increase in the likelihood of independent living-are  related. There is what I 
will call the “conventional view” (see the references in Schwartz, Danziger, 
and Smolensky 1984).  This view suggests the trend toward independence is an 
indicator of  increasing well-being of the elderly. The assumption, either im- 
plicit or explicit, is that the elderly clearly prefer living independently  to either 
living with relatives or in an institution. Thus recent trends are a sign that the 
elderly today are more likely to be free of  the health and wealth limitations 
that in the past “forced” them into alternative living arrangements.  Independent 
living simply reflects a high income elasticity of  privacy, according to this 
view. Empirical research, mostly based on cross-section studies, has generally 
been supportive. Wealth, good health, and income have all been found to be 
positively associated with the choice of an independent living arrangement. 
There is, of course, an alternative view of the trend toward independent liv- 
ing (see, for example, Borsch-Supan 1990). For whatever reason-the  entry 
of more women into the labor force is often cited-it  may be that living with 
relatives is no longer a viable alternative for many of the elderly. The trend to 
independence is a trend to isolation, reflecting constraints rather than prefer- 
ences, and the implications  for the rising well-being of the elderly are ominous. 
This study doesn’t do great damage to the conventional view of living ar- 
rangements, but it is suggestive that some recent trends may be the result more 
of constraints than of preferences. The authors’ work is the first on living ar- 
rangements to be based on the LSOA and the associated NBER Economics 
Supplement. These data are very recent (1990), which is important, given the 
pace of change. Much prior work was based on the Retirement History Survey, 
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trends. The LSOA data also have good information on health and wealth, prob- 
ably superior to anything else available for this purpose. The one shortcoming 
of these data is the absence of information on the proximity and financial re- 
sources of  kin, which would permit us to better ascertain the set of  feasible 
alternative living arrangements for elderly persons in the sample. 
The authors begin by estimating a conventional multinominal logit model of 
the choice between living independently, living with relatives or others, and 
living in an institution. Among the explanatory variables are five measured 
ADLs and three IADLs. As a group these variables provide a great deal of 
explanatory power, although the five ADLs are individually not significant, 
thus suggesting that the effect of health may be reasonably captured in fewer 
dimensions in the ensuing latent-variable  model. Age, education, and the num- 
ber of sons and daughters have the expected effects. There is surprisingly little 
effect of income, due perhaps to the presence of very good measures of wealth. 
It is these wealth effects that I find most intriguing. The three measures of 
wealth-homeownership,  financial assets, and housing assets-are  all associ- 
ated with an increase in the likelihood of living with relatives or others. 
To uncover the true effects of health, which cannot be directly measured, 
the authors adopt the MIMIC framework. Essentially they face an errors-in- 
variables problem because ADLs and IADLs only imperfectly measure true 
health. This  gives  rise to  a  two-factor  latent-variable parameterization  of 
health. Moreover, the observed health indicators are categorical. This requires 
an ordered probit model of  the health indicators as functions of  the latent 
health variables. Thus estimation of this model requires “integrating out” the 
two latent health variables from a likelihood function comprising the product 
of logit choice equations and probits. This is a formidable task that is success- 
fully executed. 
If  the question is, “Why do some elderly live independently and others in 
alternative  living arrangements?’ then the structural  MIMIC model clearly im- 
plicates health as the answer. Estimates of  the two latent health factors are 
large and significant. One of these factors is clearly capturing the general dete- 
rioration of health associated with aging. The other is more of a puzzle, having 
an unexpected negative sign in the health indicator equations. 
The wealth effects are similar to those estimated in the earlier specification 
and imply that the wealthier elderly are more likely to live with relatives or 
others. There are several possible explanations for this curious result. The au- 
thors suggest a “bribery” effect where wealthy parents are able to get their 
children, who would otherwise choose to live alone, to take them in. This ex- 
planation suggests wealthy parents are living in the homes of their children. 
Alternatively, the children may be living in the homes of their parents. This 
“wealth attracts kids” phenomenon has been observed by  others (Schwartz, 
Danziger, and Smolensky 1984) in the Retirement History Survey. In these 
data, we cannot distinguish this explanation  from the bribery hypothesis. HOW- 215  Living Arrangements: Health and Wealth Effects 
ever, the fact that more elderly persons own homes than live independently in 
this sample suggests this explanation may be reasonable. 
A final explanation focuses on the “others” in the choice category “living 
with relatives or others.” A possibility here is what Feinstein (chap. 9 in this 
volume) calls transitional living arrangements. This form of housing-some- 
where between independent and institutional-includes  many varieties such 
as congregate housing, life-care communities, and other arrangements where 
the elderly generally do not own their housing unit, but are also not part of 
an institutional arrangement. Such facilities are typically characterized by  the 
presence of  on-site dining facilities, availability of  nursing or personal care, 
and perhaps housekeeping or laundry services. It is difficult to assess how 
prevalent such arrangements are because, as a group, they are only vaguely 
defined. In particular, it is not clear how  survey respondents in transitional 
arrangements would classify their own living arrangements. About the only 
data I have been able to uncover on these arrangements  is a 1988  Congressional 
Budget Office report indicating that the percentage of elderly living with “un- 
related others” approximately doubled between 1980 and 1984. The results of 
Borsch-Supan, McFadden, and Schnabel may suggest that, once health limita- 
tions set in, these transitional facilities are the preferred next step for wealthy 
families that are either unable to or prefer not to live with relatives. More disag- 
gregated information on living arrangements would be useful to address this 
point. 
I have one final comment on the econometric innovation at the core of this 
paper. I agree with the authors that, because health is not measurable, a latent- 
variable framework is important to deal with the errors-in-variables  problem 
posed by using observed health indicators such as ADLs and IADLs. However, 
it may also be that, in some sense, the “errors” themselves may be of interest. 
For instance, given true health, the choice of living arrangements may depend 
on whether an elderly person perceives himself or herself to be limited in the 
ability to provide, say, meals (one of  the IADLs). It is conceivable that two 
persons with the same health may differ in this ability. In this case, the mea- 
sured ADLs and IADLs may provide useful additional information not cap- 
tured by  the true latent health variables. Thus it may  make sense to include 
both measured and latent health in the choice specification. 
In summary, the authors have made a significant methodological and sub- 
stantive contribution to our understanding of the determinants of  the living 
standards of the elderly. Their latent-variable characterization of  health will 
help us better understand the complex relationship between health limitations 
and housing choice. And  their results on wealth effects suggests great care 
should be exercised interpreting the trend to independent living as an indicator 
of the rising well-being of the elderly. 216  Axel Biirsch-Supan, Daniel L. McFadden, and Reinhold Schnabel 
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